Tools, objects, and chimeras: Connes on the role of hyperreals in
  mathematics by Kanovei, Vladimir et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
21
1.
02
44
v1
  [
ma
th.
FA
]  
1 N
ov
 20
12
TOOLS, OBJECTS, AND CHIMERAS: CONNES ON
THE ROLE OF HYPERREALS IN MATHEMATICS
VLADIMIR KANOVEI, MIKHAIL G. KATZ, AND THOMAS MORMANN
Abstract. We examine some of Connes’ criticisms of Robinson’s
infinitesimals starting in 1995. Connes sought to exploit the Solo-
vay model S as ammunition against non-standard analysis, but
the model tends to boomerang, undercutting Connes’ own earlier
work in functional analysis. Connes described the hyperreals as
both a “virtual theory” and a “chimera”, yet acknowledged that
his argument relies on the transfer principle. We analyze Connes’
“dart-throwing” thought experiment, but reach an opposite con-
clusion. In S, all definable sets of reals are Lebesgue measurable,
suggesting that Connes views a theory as being “virtual” if it is
not definable in a suitable model of ZFC. If so, Connes’ claim that
a theory of the hyperreals is “virtual” is refuted by the existence of
a definable model of the hyperreal field due to Kanovei and Shelah.
Free ultrafilters aren’t definable, yet Connes exploited such ultra-
filters both in his own earlier work on the classification of factors
in the 1970s and 80s, and in Noncommutative Geometry, raising
the question whether the latter may not be vulnerable to Connes’
criticism of virtuality. We analyze the philosophical underpinnings
of Connes’ argument based on Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem,
and detect an apparent circularity in Connes’ logic. We docu-
ment the reliance on non-constructive foundational material, and
specifically on the Dixmier trace −
∫
(featured on the front cover of
Connes’magnum opus) and the Hahn–Banach theorem, in Connes’
own framework. We also note an inaccuracy in Machover’s critique
of infinitesimal-based pedagogy.
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1. Infinitesimals from Robinson to Connes via Choquet
A theory of infinitesimals claiming to vindicate Leibniz’s calculus was
developed by Abraham Robinson in the 1960s (see [132]). In France,
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Robinson’s lead was followed by G. Reeb, G. Choquet,1 and others.
Alain Connes started his work under Choquet’s leadership, and pub-
lished two texts on the hyperreals and ultrapowers (Connes [23], [24]).
In 1976, Connes used ultraproducts (exploiting in particular free
ultrafilters on N) in an essential manner in his work on the classification
of factors (Connes 1976, [25]). (See Remark 8.1 for Connes’ use of
ultrafilters in Noncommutative geometry.)
During the 1970s, Connes reportedly discovered that Robinson’s in-
finitesimals were not suitable for Connes’ framework. A quarter of
a century later, in 1995, Connes unveiled an alternative theory of in-
finitesimals (Connes [28]). Connes’ presentation of his theory is usually
not accompanied by acknowledgment of an intellectual debt to Robin-
son. Instead, it is frequently accompanied by criticism of Robinson’s
framework, exploiting epithets that range from “inadequate” to “end
of the rope for being ‘explicit’ ” (see Table 1 in Section 3). We will
examine some of Connes’ criticisms, which tend to be at tension with
Connes’ earlier work. A related challenge to the hyperreal approach
was analyzed by F. Herzberg [76]. Another challenge by E. Bishop was
analyzed by Katz & Katz [93], [95]. For a related analysis see Katz &
Leichtnam [97].
In Section 2, we examine the philosophical underpinnings of Connes’
position. In Section 3, we analyze the Connes character and its rela-
tion to ultrafilters, and present a chronology of Connes’ criticisms of
NSA. In Section 4, we examine some meta-mathematical implications
of the definable model of the hyperreal field constructed by Kanovei
and Shelah. Machover’s critique is analyzed in Section 5. The power of
the  Los´-Robinson transfer principle is sized up in Section 6. The foun-
dational status of the Dixmier trace and its role in noncommutative
geometry are analyzed in Section 7.
2. Tools and objects
Connes’ variety of Platonism can be characterized more specifically
as a prescriptive Platonism, whereby one not merely postulates the
existence of abstract objects, but proceeds to assign “hierarchical lev-
els” (see Connes [41, p. 31]) of realness to them, and to issue value
judgments based on the latter. Thus, non-standard numbers and Jor-
dan algebras get flunking scores (see Section 8.3). Connes mentions
such “hierarchical levels” in the context of a dichotomy between “tool”
1See e.g., Choquet’s work on ultrafilters [20]. Choquet’s constructions were em-
ployed and extended by G. Mokobodzki [123].
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and “object”. In Connes’ view, only objects enjoy a full Platonic exis-
tence, while tools (such as ultrafilters and non-standard numbers) serve
merely the purpose of investigating the properties of the objects.
As a general methodological comment, we note the following. There
is indisputably a kind of aprioriness about the natural numbers and
other concepts in mathematics, that is not accounted for by a “formal-
ist” view of mathematics as a game of pushing symbols around. Such
aprioriness requires explanation. However, Platonism and Formalism
are not the only games in town, which is a point we will return to at
the end of the section.
To take a historical perspective on this issue, Leibniz sometimes de-
scribed infinitesimals as “useful fictions”, similar to imaginary numbers
(see Katz & Sherry [99], [100] for more details). Leibniz’s take on in-
finitesimals was a big novelty at the time and in fact displeased his
disciples Bernoulli, l’Hoˆpital, and Varignon. But Leibniz, while clearly
rejecting what would be later called a platonist view, certainly did not
think of mathematics as a meaningless game of symbols. One can crit-
icize certain forms of Platonism while adhering to the proposition that
mathematics has meaning.
2.1. Tool/object dichotomy. Connes’ approach to the tool/object
dichotomy is problematic, first and foremost, because it does not do
justice to the real history of mathematics. Mathematical concepts may
start their career as mere tools or instruments for manipulating con-
cepts already given or accepted as full-fledged objects, but later they
(the tools) may themselves become recognized as full-fledged objects.
Historical examples of such processes abound. The ancient Greeks did
not think of the rationals as numbers, but rather as relations among
natural numbers (see e.g., B laszczyk et al. [9, Section 2.1]). Wallis
and others in the 17th century were struggling with the ontological
expansion involved in incorporating irrational (transcendental) num-
bers beyond the algebraic ones in the number system. Ideal points
and ideal lines at infinity in projective geometry had to face an up-
hill battle before joining the ranks of objects that can be mentioned in
ontologically polite company (see e.g., M. Wilson [154]). G. Cantor’s
cardinals started as indices and notational subscripts for sets, and only
gradually came to be thought of as objects in their own right. Certain
well-established objects still bear the name imaginary because they
were once characterized as not possessing the same reality as genuine
objects. R. Hersh [75, p. 74] describes some striking cases, including
Fourier analysis, of a historical evolution of tools into objects.
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The distinction between “tools” and “real objects” is not only blurred
by the ongoing conceptual evolution of mathematics. It is also rela-
tive to the perspective one takes. For instance, set-theoretic topology
considers points as the basic building blocks of its objects, to wit,
topological spaces. From this perspective, nothing is a more robust
and solid object than a point. On the other hand, from the perspective
of “point-free” (lattice-theoretical) topology, the points of set-theoretic
topology appear as highly “chimerical” entities the existence of which
can only be ensured by relying on the axiom of choice or some similar
lofty principle (cf. Gierz et al. [64]). More precisely, the situation can
be described as follows. The basic objects of point-free topology are
complete Heyting algebras (locales) which correspond to the Heyting
algebras of open sets of topological spaces. The prime elements of these
algebras may be considered as their “points”. The existence of suffi-
ciently many points can only be secured by relying on the Hausdorff
maximality principle. Under some mild assumptions on the Heyting
algebras and the topological spaces involved, one can show that there
is a 1-1 correspondence between set-theoretical points of spaces and
constructed points of the corresponding Heyting algebras (cf. ibid.,
Proposition V-5.20, p. 423).
2.2. The results of Solovay and Shelah. The perspectival relativ-
ity of the tool/object distinction and the mutual dependence between
its components do not pose a problem for an account that recognizes
both tools and objects as complementary components of mathemat-
ics (that would perhaps make both of them “primordial” in Connes’
terminology; see Subsection 2.3).
This may be elaborated as follows. As in any other realm of knowl-
edge, also in mathematics, object and tool of knowledge are connected
through the activity of mathematical research and application: the one
does not make sense without the other. The dynamics of knowledge
requires that both components are not only related, but also opposed
to each other. Objects are, as the etymological roots of this word re-
veal, “resistances” or “obstacles” for knowledge (similarly for the Greek
problema and the German Gegenstand). Tools should therefore not be
disparaged as mere subjective “chimeras” but should be conceived of,
together with objects, as constitutive ingredients of the evolution of
mathematical knowledge (cf. Otte 1994 [126, ch. X]).2
2In a related vein, J.-P. Marquis [120], [121] pointed out the ever-growing im-
portance of complex conceptual tools for modern mathematics by characterizing
generalized (co)homology theories like K-theories as a kind of knowledge-producing
“machines”. Probably most mathematicians would agree in that these machines
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But for Connes such an “ecumenical” option is not available. This
leads him into difficulties. On the one hand, he relies upon the Solovay
model where all sets of real numbers are Lebesgue measurable (see Sub-
section 4.1), so as to relegate non-standard numbers to the chimerical
realm of mere tools :
tout re´el non standard de´termine canoniquement un sous-
ensemble non Lebesgue mesurable de l’intervalle [0, 1]
de sorte qu’il est impossible [Ste] d’en exhiber un seul
(Connes 1997 [29, p. 211]).
Here the reference “[Ste]” cited by Connes is an article by J. Stern [145].
The main subject of Stern’s article is a result of S. Shelah (1984 [138]).
Shelah proved that the assumption of the consistency of the proposition
that all sets of real numbers are Lebesgue measurable implies the con-
sistency of inaccessible cardinals. Connes’ citation of Stern indicates
that Connes was aware of Shelah’s 1984 result.
On the other hand, Connes ignores the fact that for the consistency of
the proposition that all sets of real numbers are Lebesgue measurable,
Solovay (see Theorem 4.1) had to assume the existence of inaccessible
cardinals, and S. Shelah showed that one cannot remove the hypothesis
of inaccessible cardinal from Solovay’s theorem. Meanwhile, Connes’
meta-mathematical speculations, such as the claim that “noone will
ever be able to name, etc.” (see Subsection 3.1) rely on Solovay’s
theorem. Therefore ultimately Connes’ meta-mathematical specula-
tions rely on inaccessible cardinals, as well. The linchpin that keeps
Connesian Platonism from unraveling turns out to be an inaccessible
cardinal, yet another chimera.
What kind of evidence does Connes present in favor of his approach?
It is of two kinds:
(1) Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem and Goodstein’s theorem;
(2) feelings of eternity.
We will examine these respectively in Subsections 2.3 and 2.4.
2.3. The incompleteness theorem: evidence for Platonism?
There is an instance of apparent circular reasoning in one of Connes’
arguments in favor of his philosophical approach in the La Recherche
interview [34].3 More specifically, Connes claims that Go¨del’s incom-
pleteness theorem furnishes evidence in favor of Connes’ philosophical
had so many useful applications that it seems a bit unfair to describe them as mere
chimeras.
3The discussion in this subsection was inspired by I. Hacking’s The Mathematical
Animal [71, chapter 5].
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Figure 1. A virtual view of primordial mathematical real-
ity: An attempted slaying of a hyperreal chimera, following
P. Uccello
approach, in that it asserts the existence of “true” propositions about
natural numbers that cannot be proved:
Or le the´ore`me de Go¨del est bien plus me´chant que cela.
Il dit qu’il y a aura toujours une proposition vraie qui
ne sera pas de´montrable dans le syste`me. Ce qui est
beaucoup plus de´rangeant (Connes 2000 [34]).
Such “true” propositions, undecidable in Peano Arithmetic (PA), are
taken by Connes to furnish evidence in favor of the hypothesis of a
mind-independent (Platonic) primordial mathematical reality (PMR),
referred to as re´alite´ mathe´matique archa¨ıque in the interview.4
However, the “truth” of such propositions refers to truth relative to
an intended interpretation of natural numbers, such as the one built in
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF) or a fragment ZF0 thereof. Relative
to such an interpretation, the said propositions are “true” but not
provable in PA. At variance with Connes, K. Kunen presents Go¨del’s
theorem (in the context of ZF) in a philosophically neutral way as
follows:
if T is any consistent set of axioms extending ZF,5 then
[the set] {ϕ : T ⊢ ϕ} is not recursive . . . A consequence
of this is Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorem—namely,
that if such a T is recursive, then it is incomplete in
4An attempt to illustrate this concept graphically may be found in Figure 1, and
further discussion in Subsection 8.2.
5Actually it is sufficient to assume that T is consistent and contains a suitable
small set of axioms governing addition and multiplication of natural numbers.
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the sense that there is a sentence ϕ such that T 6⊢ ϕ
and T 6⊢ ¬ϕ (Kunen 1980 [105, p. 38]).6
With regard to Platonism, Kunen specifically mentions that Go¨del’s
theorem, as well as the closely related Tarski’s theorem on non-definabi-
lity of truth, admit of platonist interpretations (rather than furnishing
evidence in favor of Platonism):
The platonistic interpretation of [Tarski’s theorem] is
that no formula χ(x) can say “x is a true sentence”7
(Kunen 1980 [105, p. 41]).
While Connes’ argument appears to rely on an unspoken hypothesis
of an imbedding of such a fragment ZF0 in his PMR, he is certainly
free to believe in the hypothesis of such an imbedding
ZF0 →֒ PMR. (2.1)
Our goal here is to argue neither in favor nor against Connes’ hypoth-
esis (2.1), but rather to point out an apparent circularity inherent in
Connes’ argument. Connes seeks to argue in favor of Platonism based
on Go¨del’s result, but an unspoken hypothesis of his argument is. . .
Platonism itself, about some fragment ZF0 properly containing PA,
betraying an apparent circularity in his logic.
When Postel-Vinay (the La Recherche interviewer) pressed Connes
for examples of statements that are “true” but not provable, Connes fell
back on what he called “La fable du lie`vre et de la tortue” (“the hare
and the turtle” phenomenon). What Connes describes here is in fact
Goodstein’s theorem [69]. As its name suggests, this “true” theorem
does admit of a proof, namely Goodstein’s. The proof takes place
not in PA but rather in a fragment assuming ǫ0-transfinite induction.
Relative to such a widely accepted infinitary hypothesis, Goodstein’s
theorem is provable and therefore true.
M. Davis [46] argued that Π01 sentences such as Cons(PA) are equiv-
alent to checking specific Diophantine questions, and therefore their
truth value should be determinate, and described such a viewpoint as
pragmatic Platonism [47]. Meanwhile, Connes is characteristically eva-
sive as to the scope of his platonist beliefs, but his categorical tone
suggests a rather broad Platonism. What is clear, at any rate, is that
6The string T ⊢ ϕ denotes the statement “sentence ϕ is provable in theory T ”,
while the string T 6⊢ ϕ denotes the statement “ϕ is not provable in T ”.
7In some rare cases, it is possible to document a kind of “model-theoretic failure”
of the Tarski truth undefinability theorem. Thus Kanovei [86] (and independently
L. Harrington, unpublished) showed that in a suitable model of ZFC, the set of all
analytically definable reals is defined analytically; namely, it is equal to the set of
Go¨del-constructible reals.
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his Platonism transcends the Π01 class of the arithmetic hierarchy (since
Goodstein’s theorem falls outside that class) and is probably much
broader. In terms of Shapiro’s distinction between realism in ontology
and realism in truth-value [136, p. 37], Davis may be described as a
truth-value realist while Connes, an ontological one.
2.4. Premonitions of eternity. Connes’ additional argument invokes
“a feeling of eternity” in connection with his PMR:
La diffe´rence essentielle . . . c’est qu’elle e´chappe a` toute
forme de localisation dans l’espace ou dans le temps. Si
bien que lorsqu’on en de´voile ne serait-ce qu’une infime
partie, on e´prouve un sentiment d’e´ternite´. Tous les
mathe´maticiens le savent (Connes 2000 [34]) [emphasis
added–the authors].
Taking such a “sentiment d’eternite´” as the ultimate litmus test for
one’s reflection on what mathematics is and what mathematicians do
is a powerful means of effectively cutting off any further reflection on
the nature and the aim of mathematics and its role in the context
of culture and society at large. After all, my “sentiments” may be
different from yours, and there is no room for rational argumentation.
To take this road, one must invoke other means of deciding which
sentiments are justified and which are not, such as appeals to the great
mathematicians : their “sentiments” are taken to need no justification
at all, as they are the only ones taken to have a legitimate say on what
mathematics in its essence really is (see, however, Subsection 2.6 for
the anti-Platonist sentiments of M. Atiyah).
However, relying on “sentiments” when dealing with ontological is-
sues concerning mathematics not only has damaging effects on the
discourse about mathematics in general. It also affects rather con-
crete issues concerning the history of mathematics. Arguably, a brand
of prescriptive Platonism about the real number continuum may, in
fact, be at the root of historical misconceptions concerning key fig-
ures and pivotal mathematical developments. Thus, consider the is-
sue of Fermat’s technique of adequality (stemming from Diophantus’s
παρισo´της) for solving problems of tangents and maxima and minima.
Fermat’s technique involves an aspect of approximation and “small-
ness” in an essential way, as shown by its applications to transcendental
curves and variational problems such as Snell’s law (see Cifoletti [22];
Katz, Schaps, & Shnider [98]). This aspect of Fermat’s technique is,
however, oddly denied by such Fermat scholars as H. Breger [13] and
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K. Barner [3]. Similarly, the non-Archimedean nature of Leibniz’s in-
finitesimals is routinely denied by some modern scholars (see Ishig-
uro [83], Levey [108]), inspite of ample evidence is Leibniz’s writings
(see Jesseph [84]; Katz & Sherry [99], [100]). A close textual analysis
of Cauchy’s foundational writings reveals the existence of a Cauchy–
Weierstrass discontinuity rather than continuity, pace Grabiner [70]
(see B laszczyk et al. [9]; Borovik & Katz [11]; Br˚ating [12]; Katz &
Katz [95], [92]; Sinaceur [140]).
2.5. Cantor’s dichotomy. Cantor may be said to have opened Pan-
dora’s box of the “chimeras” of modern mathematics. It appears that
Cantor had a more elaborate and flexible concept of mathematical re-
ality than does Connes. In his Foundations of a general theory of
manifolds [16], Cantor pointed out that we may speak in two distinct
ways of the reality or existence of mathematical concepts.
First, we may consider mathematical concepts as real insofar as they,
due to their definitions, occupy a fully determined place in our mind
whereby they can be distinguished perfectly from all other components
of our thought to which they stand in certain relations. Thereby they
are real since they may modify the substance of our mind in certain
ways. Cantor called this kind of mathematical reality intrasubjective
or immanent reality.
On the other hand, one may ascribe reality to mathematical concepts
insofar as they can be considered as expressions or images of processes
and relations of the outside world. Cantor referred to this kind of re-
ality as transient reality. Cantor had no doubt that these two kinds
of reality eventually came together. Namely, concepts with solely im-
manent reality would, in the course of time, acquire transient reality,
as well. By this two-tiered concept of the reality or “Wirklichkeit” of
mathematical entities Cantor thought to have done justice to the ide-
alist as well as to the realist aspects of mathematics and mathematized
sciences.8
8Cantor’s actions did not always faithfully reflect his professed flexible and toler-
ant attitude toward immanent “chimeras”. As is well-known, he was eagerly hunt-
ing down infinitesimals of all kinds as allegedly noxious chimeras to be eliminated.
One of his strategies of elimination was the publication of a “proof” of an alleged
inconsistency of infinitesimals. Accepting Cantor’s analysis on faith, B. Russell
declared infinitesimals to be inconsistent [134, p. 345], influencing countless other
philosophers and mathematicians. The errors in Cantor’s “proof” are analyzed by
P. Ehrlich [54]. It is interesting to note that Cantor’s contemporary B. Kerry was
apparently unconvinced by either Cantor’s feelings of eternity or by his “proof”,
and tried to put up an argument, but was scornfully rebuffed by Cantor, who con-
demned Kerry’s alleged “deplorable psychologistic blindness” (see C. Proietti [129,
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Our analysis of Connes’ approach should not be misunderstood. We
do not deny that the distinction between tool and object is an eminently
useful one. The point is that one has to take into account the historical
and relative character of this distinction. Exactly this Connes’ Platon-
ism does not do. Thereby it is blinded to certain essential features of
modern mathematical knowledge. The manifest historical evolution of
the domain of mathematical objects and the emergence of new tools,
which depend on the changing character of the object domain, points to
a dynamism of the ontological realm of mathematics to which Connes’
vision of a “primordial mathematical reality” (PMR) is directly op-
posed. Connes’ account of mathematical knowledge implies a static
ontology. The innate weakness of Connes’ vision of PMR is that it
ignores the inevitable interaction between tools and objects in science.
Furthermore, such an interaction between tools and objects brings
into play the institution of a subject that is actively using and creating
both tools and objects for its specific purposes that may change over
time and historical context. In Connes’ account, the subject (that
is engaged in “doing” mathematics) fatally resembles the ideal, non-
empirical subject of classical philosophy for which finiteness and other
empirical limitations of the real empirical subjects were philosophically
irrelevant.
Despite his platonist preferences, history as well as subject-with-a-
history is surreptiously introduced by Connes himself, however. The
talk of tools only makes sense if a subject, i.e., an agent is presupposed
that employs these tools for its purposes. Connes’ subject is a trans-
mundane and very abstract entity. A more convincing choice of the
subject would be a historically situated subject. After all, it can hardly
be denied that mathematics as every other scientific discipline has un-
dergone a historical development; our mathematics is not the same as
Greek mathematics, and it is hardly plausible that the mathematics of
the future will be “essentially the same” as present-day mathematics.
The line between tools and objects is moving. A tool may gain the
status of an object and, conversely, an object may become a tool in a
suitable context.
2.6. Atiyah’s anti-platonist realism. Not all great contemporary
mathematicians share Connes’ philosophical position. Thus, Sir Michael
Atiyah confided:
I consider myself as a realist. I think the mathematics
we use is derived from the outside world by observation
p. 356]) and concluded: “Dixi et salvavi animam meam. I think I did my best to
dissuade you from your deplorable mistakes” (ibid.).
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and abstraction. If we didn’t live in the outside world
and see things, we wouldn’t have invented things and
thought of things as we do. I think that much of what
we do is based on what we see, but then abstracted
and simplified, and in that sense they become the ideal
things of Plato, but they have an origin in the outside
world and that’s what brings them close to physics. . . .
You can’t separate the human mind from the physical
world. And therefore everything we think of, in some
sense or other, derives from the physical world (Atiyah
2005, [2, p. 38]).
Atiyah’s outline of a realistic conception of mathematics is not, of
course, without problems. For instance, one may object that we do
not spend our life time by merely “seeing the outside world”. Rather,
we are beings in a material world and have to come to terms with the
multifarious challenges that the world poses to us. Hence, rather than
describing our contact with the outside world as “seeing”, it may be
more appropriate to adopt a broader approach that emphasizes the
multifaceted totality of the various activities in which cognizing beings
like us are engaged. One may object that Atiyah does not elaborate
much on the profound issue of what exactly is meant by “deriving
mathematics from the outside world” and how this is carried out. We
think that such a criticism would be a bit unfair. One may well argue
that these issues are not, properly speaking, mathematical issues and
therefore are not a primary concern for mathematicians.
2.7. Mac Lane’s form and function. A more elaborate account of
how “mathematics is derived from the outside world” can be found
in Saunders Mac Lane’s Mathematics, Form and Function (Mac Lane
1986 [117]). This book recorded Mac Lane’s
efforts . . . to capture in words a description of the form
and function of Mathematics, as a background for the
Philosophy of Mathematics” (Preface).
Here Mac Lane compiled a list of rather mundane activities such as col-
lecting, counting, comparing, observing, moving and others that can be
considered as the modest origins of the high-brow concepts of contem-
porary mathematics (ibid., p. 35). An interesting elaboration of Mac
Lane’s account may be found inWhere Mathematics Comes From. How
the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being (Lakoff & Nu´n˜ez
2000 [106]).
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The details of the processes underlying the historical evolution of
mathematics may not be fully understood yet. However, cutting off
any further discussion on these issues by falling back on “feelings of
eternity” does not seem the best way to meet such challenges. Mathe-
matics, as any other intellectual endeavor, cannot be considered as an
autonomous domain totally cut off from other areas of knowledge. As
Atiyah put it explicitly:
The idea that there is a pure world of mathematical ob-
jects (and perhaps other ideal objects) totally divorced
from our experience, which somehow exists by itself is
obviously inherent nonsense (Atiyah 2006 [2, p. 38]).
A PMR-free perspective on mathematics is gaining momentum. In
fact, Connes’ feelings of eternity may be misdirected. Scholars from
many a discipline converge to a view that thinking about mathematics
should not treat the latter as an isolated endeavor, separate from other
areas of knowledge.
2.8. Margenau and Dennett: To be or . . . Connes’ radical Pla-
tonism with its postulation of a strict separation of the sphere of math-
ematics from the rest of the world is, in a sense, radically anti-modern.
Modernity in the sciences began with a turn toward epistemological
and semantical questions, leaving aside classical ontological questions
such as “What is the essence of the world?”, “What is the essence of
Man?”, or, more to the point of the present paper, “What is the essence
of number or space?”. Instead, in the modern perspective, semantical
and epistemological questions such as “What is the meaning of this
or that scientific concept in this or that context?”, “What is scien-
tific knowledge?”, or “Can one make sense of the progress in science?”
take centerstage. In this way, ontology, epistemology, and semantics
get inextricably intertwined. In particular, ontology became theory-
dependent. For the mathematized sciences of nature, the neo-Kantian
philosopher Ernst Cassirer expressed this observation explicitly as fol-
lows:
[Scientific] concepts are valid not in that they copy a
fixed, given being, but insofar as they contain a plan
for possible constructions of unity, which must be pro-
gressively verified in practice . . . (Cassirer 1957 [18,
p. 476]).
What we need is not the objectivity of absolute concepts (it seems
difficult to give convincing arguments to account for how one could
have cognitive access to such concepts), but rather objective methods
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which determine the rational and reliable practice of our intersubjective
empirical science. As Cassirer put it,
What we need is not the objectivity of absolute objects,
but rather the objective determinacy of the method of
experience (ibid.)
Cassirer’s characterisation of scientific concepts as applied to math-
ematical concepts amounts to the contention that mathematical con-
cepts should not be conceived of as intending to copy a pre-existing pla-
tonic universe but “contain plans for possible constructions of unity”.
This characterization would match quite well with Hilbert’s dictum “By
their fruits ye will known them”. If this is true, a “theory of chimeras”
a` la Connes hardly provides a promising framework for dealing with
these problems.
Rather, what is needed is an investigation of the entire spectrum of
the various meanings of the concept of being as it is used in modern
science. The need for such an investigation was pointed out by Cas-
sirer’s friend and colleague, the renowned physicist Henry Margenau,
by means of the following provocative question:
Do masses, electrons, atoms, magnetic field strengths
etc., exist? Nothing is more surprising indeed than the
fact that . . . most of us still expect an answer to this
question in terms of yes or no. . . . Almost every term
that has come under scientific scrutiny has lost its ini-
tally absolute significance and acquired a range of mean-
ing of which even the boundaries are often variable. Ap-
parently the word to be has escaped this process (Mar-
genau 1935 [118, p. 164]).
Margenau argued in favor of a nuanced concept of “the real” based
on an elaborate theory of theoretical constructs in which “tools” and
“objects” interact in complex ways (cf. Margenau 1935 [118], Margenau
1950 [119]).
Sixty years later, Margenau’s question was taken up and generalized
to the object of other sciences by Daniel Dennett:
Are there really beliefs? Or are we learning (from neuro-
science and psychology, presumably) that strictly speak-
ing, beliefs are figments of our imagination, items in a
superseded ontology. Philosophers generally regard such
ontological questions as admitting just two possible an-
swers: either beliefs exist or they do not. (Dennett 1991
[49, p. 27]).
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Dennett argued that an ontological account centered around the con-
cept of “patterns” may be helpful to develop an “intermediate” (Den-
nett’s term) position that conceives of beliefs and other questionable
abstract entities as patterns of some data. Taking data as a bit stream,
a pattern is said to exist in some data, i.e., is real if there is a descrip-
tion of the data that is more efficient than the bit map, whether or not
anyone can concoct it. Thereby centers of gravity exist in physicalist
ontologies because they are good abstract concepts that perform some
useful work. Meanwhile, bogus concepts such as “Dennett’s lost socks
center” (defined as “the center of the smallest sphere that can be cir-
cumscribed around all the socks Dennett ever lost in his life”) do not
obtain this status but remain meaningless “chimeras” (ibid., 28).
In a somewhat analogous way, Michael Resnik and other philosophers
of mathematics are working on a project of describing “mathematics as
a science of patterns”, in which Resnik defends the thesis that mathe-
matical structures obtain their reality as “patterns of reality” (Resnik
1997 [131]).
This section is not the place to engage in an in-depth study of these
and similar attempts to clarify the murky issue of the ontology and epis-
temology of mathematics. Our goal is merely to evoke some possibly
fruitful directions of inquiry that may help overcome the limitations of
the traditional accounts of formalism, intuitionism, and platonism. In
the long run it is unsatisfying (to put it mildly) to play off against each
other these classical positions over and over again, by manufacturing
unappealing and unrealistic strawmen of the other party. Such dated
ideas on the nature of mathematics do not exhaust the spectrum of
possible approaches to the epistemology and ontology of mathematics.
Connes’ views on non-standard analysis are inseparable from his
philosophical position, as we discuss in Section 3.
3. “Absolutely major flaw” and “irremediable defect”
Having clarified the philosophical underpinnings of Connes’ views
in Section 2, we now turn to the details of his critique. Connes pub-
lished his magnum opus Noncommutative geometry (an expanded Eng-
lish version of an earlier French text) in 1994. Shortly afterwards,
Connes published his first criticism of non-standard analysis (NSA) in
1995, describing the non-standard framework as being “inadequate”.
In 1997, the adjective was “de´cevante” (see [29]). By 2000, Connes was
describing non-standard numbers as “chimeras”. Such criticisms have
appeared in his books, research articles, interviews, and a blog.
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It is instructive to compare two papers Connes wrote around 2000.
The paper [33] in Journal of Mathematical Physics (JMP) presents
Connes’ theory of infinitesimals without a trace of any reference to
either NSA or the Solovay model. The other text from the same period
(see [30], [31], [32]) presents the – by then – familiar meta-mathematical
speculations around the Solovay model (see Section 4 for details), and
proceeds to criticize NSA. The JMP text demonstrates that Connes
is perfectly capable of presenting his approach to infinitesimals (which
he claims to be entirely different from Robinson’s) without criticizing
NSA.
Connes was familiar with the ultrapower construction RN/F of the
hyperreals, having authored the 1970 articles [23] and [24]. At least
on one occasion, Connes described ultraproducts as “very efficient”,9
which adds another dimension to the puzzle. To understand Connes’
position, one may have to examine the historical context of his changing
attitude toward non-standard analysis. After Robinson’s death in 1974,
many voices were heard that were critical of Robinson’s theory. Active
in this area were Paul Halmos and his student Errett Bishop [7] (see
Katz & Katz [93]). Some of the criticisms were plain incoherent, such
as John Earman’s [53] in 1975 (see Katz & Sherry [99, Section 11.2]),
suggesting that for a time, it was sufficient to criticize Robinson to get
published. It may have become difficult starting in the mid-1970s to
be a supporter of Robinson, and it would have been natural for young
researchers to seek to distance themselves from him. The objection
to hyperreal numbers on the part of many mathematicians may be
due, consciously or unconsciously, to their attitude that the traditional
model of the real numbers in the context of ZF is a true representation
of Reality itself10 and that hyperreal numbers are therefore a contrived
model that does not represent anything of interest, even if it provides
a solution to some paradox. E. Nelson, however, turned the tables
on this attitude, by introducing an enriched syntax into ZF, building
the “usual” real line R in ZF with the enriched syntax, and exhibiting
infinitesimals within the real line R itself (see Nelson [125]). Related
systems were elaborated by K. Hrba´cˇek (1978, [79]), T. Kawai (1983,
[101]) and Kanovei (1991, [87]).
3.1. The book. The 2001 book [41] was ostensibly authored by Connes,
A. Lichnerowicz, and M. Schu¨tzenberger. Lichnerowicz and Schu¨tzen-
berger died several years prior to the book’s publication. A reviewer
notes:
9See main text at footnote 43.
10An alternative view is explored in [94].
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The main contributions to the conversations come from
Connes [. . . ] and the fact that some of Connes’ contri-
butions look relatively polished may indicate that they
have been edited to some extent [. . . ] Connes often ex-
plains a topic in a more or less systematic way; Schu¨tzen-
berger makes interesting comments, often from a very
different angle while introducing many side-subjects, Lich-
nerowicz interjects skeptical remarks (D. Dieks 2002 [50]).
The book’s discussion of NSA in the form of an exchange with Schu¨tzen-
berger appears on pages 15-21. Here Connes expresses himself as fol-
lows on the subject of non-standard analysis:
A.C. - [. . . ] I became aware of an absolutely major
flaw in this theory, an irremediable defect. It is this:
in nonstandard analysis, one is supposed to manipulate
infinitesimals; yet, if such an infinitesimal is given, start-
ing from any given nonstandard number, a subset of the
interval automatically arises which is not measurable in
the sense of Lebesgue.
M.P.S. - Aha!
A.C. - Yes, a nonstandard number yields in a simple
canonical way, a subset of [0, 1] which is not measurable
in the sense of Lebesgue [. . . ] What conclusion can one
draw about nonstandard analysis? This means that,
since noone will ever be able to name a nonstandard
number, the theory remains virtual, and has absolutely
no significance except as a tool to understand “primor-
dial mathematical reality”11 (Connes 2001, [41, p. 16])
[emphasis added–the authors]
Connes goes on12 to criticize the role of the axiom of choice in non-
standard analysis (ibid., p. 17).
Connes’ criticisms of non-standard analysis have appeared in numer-
ous venues, and have been repeatedly discussed.13 Some of the epithets
he used for NSA, arranged by year, appear in Table 1.
Some of Connes’ criticisms are more specific than others. Thus, the
precise meaning of his terms such as “virtual theory” and “primor-
dial mathematical reality” is open to discussion (see Section 2). We
11See Subsection 2.3 for an analysis of the term “primordial mathematical
reality”.
12The continuation of the discussion is dealt with in Subsection 3.7.
13See, e.g., http://mathoverflow.net/questions/57072/a-remark-of-connes
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date epithet source
1995 “inadequate” [28, p. 6207]
1997 “de´cevante” [disappointing] [29, p. 211]
2000 “very bad obstruction” [32, p. 20]
2000 “chimera” [32, p. 21]
2001 “absolutely major flaw”; “irremediable de-
fect”; “the theory remains virtual”
[41, p. 16]
2007 “I have found a catch in the theory”; “it
seemed utterly doomed to failure to try to
use non-standard analysis to do physics”
[35, p. 26]
2007 “the promised land for ‘infinitesimals’ ”;
“the end of the rope for being ‘explicit’ ”
[36]
Table 1. Connes’ epithets for NSA arranged chronologically.
will focus on the more mathematically identifiable claim of a canoni-
cal derivation of a Lebesgue nonmeasurable set from a non-standard
number, as well as the role of Solovay’s models in Connes’ criticism.
Note that a construction of a nonmeasurable set starting from a
hyperinteger was described decades earlier by W. Luxemburg (1963
[114] and 1973 [115, Theorem 10.2, p. 66]), K. Stroyan & Luxemburg
(1973 [147]), and M. Davis (1977 [45, pp. 71-74]).14
3.2. Skolem’s non-standard integers. Before going into the mathe-
matical details of Connes’ criticism of non-standard numbers, we would
like to comment on its historical scope. Connes’ criticism of non-
standard integers is worded in such a general fashion that one wonders
if it would encompass also the non-standard integers constructed by
T. Skolem in the 1930s (see Skolem 1933 [141], 1934 [142]; an English
version may be found in Skolem 1955 [143]). Skolem’s accomplishment
is generally regarded as a major milestone in the development of 20th
century logic.
D. Scott [135, p. 245] compares Skolem’s predicative approach with
the ultrapower approach (Skolem’s nonstandard integers are also dis-
cussed by Bell & Slomson [5] and Stillwell [146, pp. 148-150]). Scott
14Davis noted recently [48] that he based his construction on (Luxemburg
1962 [113]), by filling in the proof of Theorem 9.1 in [45, p. 72] and otherwise
following Luxemburg.
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notes that Skolem used the ring DF of algebraically (first-order) de-
finable functions from integers to integers. The quotient DF/P of DF
by a minimal prime ideal P produces Skolem’s non-standard integers.
The ideal P corresponds to a prime ideal in the Boolean algebra of
idempotents. Note that the idempotents of DF are the characteristic
functions of (first-order) definable sets of integers. Such sets give rise
to a denumerable Boolean algebra P and therefore can be given an
ordered basis. Such a basis for P is a nested sequence15
Xn ⊃ Xn+1 ⊃ . . .
such that Y ∈ P if and only if Y ⊃ Xn for a suitable n. Choose a
sequence (sn) such that
sn ∈ Xn \Xn+1.
Then functions f, g ∈ DF are in the same equivalence class if and only
if
(∃N)(∀n ≥ N) f(sn) = g(sn).
The sequence (sn) is the comparing function used by Skolem to parti-
tion the definable functions into congruence classes. Note that, even
though Skolem places himself in a context limited to definable func-
tions, a key role in the theory is played by the comparing function
which is not definable.
3.3. The Connes character. In Subsection 3.1, we cited Connes to
the effect that a nonmeasurable set “automatically” arises, and that a
non-standard number “canonically” produces such a set. Challenged
to elaborate on his claim, Connes expressed himself as follows:
Pour exhiber un ensemble non-mesurable a partir d’un
entier non-standard n il suffit de prendre le caracte`re
de G = (Z/2Z)N qui est donne´ par l’evaluation de la
composante an . . . On obtient un caracte`re non continu
de G et il est donc non-mesurable (Connes 2009, [37]).
Similar remarks appear at Connes’ non-standard blog (Connes [36]).
In more detail, consider the natural numbers N, and form the infinite
product G = (Z/2Z)N (when equipped with the product topology, it is
homeomorphic to the Cantor set). Each n ∈ N gives rise to a homo-
morphism χn : G→ Z/2Z given by evaluation at the n-th component.
Each element x ∈ G can be thought of as a map
x : N→ Z/2Z = {e, a}, (3.1)
15We reversed the inclusions as given in [135, p. 245] so as to insist on the analogy
with a filter.
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where e is the additive identity element and a is the multiplicative
identity element. Consider the set
Ax = x
−1(a) ⊂ N. (3.2)
Then x can be thought of as an “indicator” function of the set Ax. In
non-standard analysis, the map x of (3.1) has a natural extension ∗x
whose domain is the ring of hypernatural numbers, ∗N:
∗x : ∗N→ Z/2Z. (3.3)
Now let n ∈ ∗N \N be an infinite hypernatural. The evaluation of the
map ∗x of (3.3) at n gives the value ∗x(n) ∈ Z/2Z of ∗x at n. This again
produces a homomorphism from ∗G to Z/2Z. Its restriction to G ⊂ ∗G
is denoted
χn : G→ Z/2Z, x 7→
∗x(n). (3.4)
Thus, the character16 χn maps G to Z/2Z = {e, a}. Here
χn(x) = a if and only if n ∈
∗Ax, (3.5)
where ∗Ax ⊂
∗N is the natural extension of the set Ax ⊂ N of (3.2).
Connes notes that the character χn is nonmeasurable. He describes
the passage from n to the character as “canonical”, and alleges that
non-standard analysis introduces entities that lead “canonically” to
nonmeasurable objects.17
3.4. From character to ultrafilter. The Connes character χn carries
the same information as an ultrafilter. Indeed, consider the inverse
image of a ∈ Z/2Z under the character χn of (3.4), namely, χ
−1
n (a) ⊂ G.
To each x ∈ χ−1n (a), we can associate the subset Ax ∈ P(N) of (3.2).
18
If n ∈ ∗N \ N is a fixed hypernatural, then the collection{
Ax ∈ P(N) : χn(x) = a
}
yields a free ultrafilter on N. By (3.5), Connes’ construction can be
canonically identified with the following construction.
16A character is generally understood to have image in C; if one wishes to think
of (3.4) as a character, one identifies Z/2Z with {±1} ⊂ C.
17Another interpretation: G = (Z/2Z)N is the standard product which is a com-
pact metrizable group. Each element x ∈ G has an internal extension ∗x defined
on ∗N. Thus, if n is a standard or non-standard hypernatural, then ∗x can be
evaluated at n. Now the continuous dual of G, by Pontryagin duality, is the al-
gebraic direct sum of countably many copies of Z/2Z with the discrete topology.
Thus, the evaluation at a non-standard integer n is not continuous and therefore
not measurable, and cannot be equal a.e. to a Borel function.
18Here P(N) denotes the set of subsets of N.
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Construction 3.1. Choose an unlimited hypernatural n ∈ ∗N, and
construct the ultrafilter F ⊂ P(N) consisting of subsets A ⊂ N whose
natural extension ∗A ⊂ ∗N contains n:
F = {A ∈ P(N) : n ∈ ∗A} . (3.6)
The important remark at this stage is that Connes’ construction
exploits a new principle of reasoning introduced by Robinson, called
the transfer principle.19 The reliance of the construction on the transfer
principle was acknowledged20 by Connes [38].
Remark 3.2. If one applies Construction 3.1 to the hypernatural
n = [(1, 2, 3, ...)], (3.7)
i.e., the equivalence class of the sequence listing all the natural numbers,
then one recovers precisely the ultrafilter F used in the ultrapower
construction of a hyperreal field as the quotient21
∗R = RN/F . (3.8)
3.5. A forgetful functor. Connes has repeatedly used the terminol-
ogy of “canonical” in his publications, as in the claim that “a hyperreal
number canonically produces” a nonmeasurable entity. To an unin-
formed reader, this may sound similar to an assertion that “to every
rational number one can canonically associate a pair of integers” (re-
duce to lowest terms), or “to every real number one can canonically
associate a unique Dedekind cut” on Q. Both of these statements are
true if the field is given up to isomorphism, with no additional struc-
ture.
It is not entirely clear if Connes means to choose an element from
a specific model of a hyperreal field, or an element22 from an isomor-
phism type of such a model (i.e., its class up to isomorphism). We will
therefore examine both possibilities:
(1) element of an isomorphism type of a hyperreal field; or
(2) element of a particular non-standard model.
Briefly, we argue that in the former case Connes’ claim is false. Mean-
while, in the latter case, the complaint is moot as we already have
an ultrafilter F , namely the one used to build the model as in (3.8).
19The transfer principle for ultraproduct-type nonstandard models follows from
 Los´’s theorem dating from 1955 (see [112]).
20See Subsection 3.7 at footnote 28 for a further discussion of the role of the
transfer principle.
21More precisely, we form the quotient of RN by the space of real sequences that
vanish on members of F . The notational ambiguity is widespread in the literature.
22More precisely, the orbit of an element under field automorphisms.
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Thus, Connes’ “canonical” procedure is canonically equivalent to a
black box23 that canonically returns its input (namely, the original ul-
trafilter F ; see Remark 3.2). More precisely, it is a forgetful functor Φ
from the category E of hyperreal enlargements to the category U of
ultrafilters:
Φ : E → U , Φ
(
R;F ; ∗R = RN/F ; ∗
)
= F . (3.9)
3.6. P -points and Continuum Hypothesis. We argue that to pro-
duce a canonical ultrafilter from a hyperreal, an isomorphism type of ∗R
does not suffice. To see this, assume for the sake of simplicity the truth
of the continuum hypothesis (CH); note that a procedure claimed to
be “canonical” should certainly work in the assumption of CH, as well.
Now in the traditional Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom
of Choice (ZFC) together with the assumption of CH, we have the
following theorem (see Erdo¨s et al. 1955, [57]).
Theorem 3.3 (Erdo¨s et al.). In ZFC+CH, all models of ∗R of the
form RN/F are isomorphic as ordered fields.24
Meanwhile, the ultrafilter F may or may not be of a type called a
“P -point”. The most relevant property of an ultrafilter F of this type
is that every infinitesimal in RN/F is representable by a null sequence,
i.e., a sequence tending to zero (see Cutland et al. [43]). Meanwhile,
not all ultrafilters are P -points.25
Thus, the isomorphism type of ∗R does not retain the information as
to which ultrafilter was used in the construction thereof. If F is a P -
point, then the hypernatural (3.7) fed into (3.6) will return the P -point
ultrafilter F itself, but also every choice of a hyperinteger n ∈ ∗N \ N
would yield a P -point (this follows from the properties of the Rudin–
Keisler order on the ultrafilters).
If a P -point F were used in the construction of ∗R, any imaginable
“canonical” construction (such as Connes’, exploiting the transfer prin-
ciple) would have to yield a P -point, as well. But if all one knows is
the isomorphism class of ∗R, the nature of the ultrafilter used in the
23See also main text in Section 3.8 at footnote 29.
24In fact, the uniqueness up to isomorphism of this ordered field is equivalent to
CH (see Farah & Shelah [59]).
25Thus, W. Rudin (1956, [133]) proved the following results assuming CH. Recall
that a space is called homogeneous if for any two points, there is a homeomorphism
taking one to the other.
Theorem 4.4: βN−N is not homogeneous; Theorem 4.2: βN−N has 2c P -points;
Theorem 4.7: for any two P -points of βN−N, there is a homeomorphism of βN−N
that carries one to the other.
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construction cannot be detected; it may well have been a non-P -point
ultrafilter. We thus obtain the following:
There does not exist a canonical construction of a non-
principal ultrafilter from an element26 in an isomorphism
type of a hyperreal field.
Such a construction could not exist unless one is working with ad-
ditional data (i.e., in addition to the isomorphism type), such as a
specific enlargement R → ∗R with a transfer principle, where we can
apply Construction 3.1. However, the construction of such an enlarge-
ment requires an ultrafilter to begin with! This reveals a circularity in
Connes’ claim.
3.7. Contrasting infinitesimals. We continue our analysis of the
discussion between Schu¨tzenberger and Connes started above in Sub-
section 3.1. Connes contrasts his infinitesimals with Robinson’s in-
finitesimals in the following terms:
An infinitesimal [in Connes’ theory] is a certain type of
operator which I am not going to define. What I want
to emphasize is that in the critique of the nonstandard
model, the axiom of choice plays an extremely important
role that I would like to make explicit. In logic, when
one constructs a nonstandard model, for example of the
integers, or of the real line, one tacitly uses the axiom of
choice. It is applied in an uncountable situation (Connes
[41, p. 17]) [emphasis added–the authors].
The comment appears to suggest that Robinson’s theory relies on un-
countable choice but Connes’ does not. The validity or otherwise of
this suggestion will be discussed below (see end of this Subsection).
The discussion continues as folows:
M.P.S. - What you are saying is fantastic. I had never
paid attention to the fact that the countable axiom of
choice differed from the uncountable one. I must say
that I have nothing to do with the axiom of choice in
daily life.
A.L. - Of course not! (Connes [41, p. 17]).
What emerges from Schu¨tzenberger’s comments is that he “never
paid attention” to the distinction between the countable case of the
axiom of choice and the general case. The continuation of the discussion
26See footnote 22.
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reveals that Schu¨tzenberger is similarly ignorant of the concept of a well
ordering :
M.P.S. What do you mean by “well ordering”!?
A.C. Well ordering! The integers have the property
that . . . [there follows a page-long introduction to well
ordering.]
M.P.S. Amazing!
A.L. [Lichnerowicz] So the countable and uncountable
axioms of choice are different.
A.C. Absolutely. It is worth noting that most main-
stream mathematics only requires the countable axiom
of choice27 [. . . ] (Connes [41, p. 20-21]).
Connes’ discussion of the distinction between the countable axiom
of choice (AC) and the general AC appears to suggest that one of the
shortcomings of non-standard analysis is the reliance on the uncount-
able axiom of choice.
Such a suggestion is surprising, since Connes’ own framework simi-
larly exploits nonprincipal ultrafilters which cannot be obtained with
merely the countable AC (see Remark 4.4, Section 7, and Remark 8.1).
The impression created by the discussion that Connes’ theory relies on
countable AC alone, is therefore spurious.
3.8. A virtual discussion. Shu¨tzenberger was not in a position to
challenge any of Connes’ claims due to ignorance of basic concepts of set
theory such as the notion of a well ordering. Had he been more knowl-
edgeable about such subjects, the discussion may have gone rather
differently.
M.P.S. - I have the following question concerning the
evaluation at a nonstandard integer. Why does this pro-
duce a character?
27It is difficult to argue with a contention that “mainstream mathematics only
requires the countable axiom of choice”, since the term mainstream mathematics
is sufficiently vague to accomodate a suitable interpretation with respect to which
the contention will become accurate. Note, however, that such an interpretation
would have to relegate Connes’ work in functional analysis on the classification of
factors (for which Connes received his Fields medal) to the complement of “most
mainstream mathematics”, as his work exploited ultrafilters in an essential manner,
whereas ZF+DC is not powerful enough to prove the existence of ultrafilters (see
Remark 4.2).
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A.C. - The recipe is very simple to get a character
from a nonstandard integer:
(1) View an element x of the compact group CN as a
map n→ x(n) from the integers N to the group C
with two elements ±1.
(2) Given a non-standard integer n the evaluation ∗x(n)
gives an element of ∗C, but since C is finite one
has ∗C = C.
(3) The map x → ∗x(n) is a character of the compact
group CN since it is a multiplicative map from CN
to ±1.
(4) This character cannot be measurable, since other-
wise it would be continuous and hence n would be
standard.
M.P.S. - I was precisely asking why it is true that,
as you mention in step (3), the map x → ∗x(n) is a
multiplicative map.
A.C. - Just because the product xy of two elements x, y
in the group CN is defined by the equality (xy)(n) =
x(n)y(n) for all n, and this equality is first order and
holds hence also for non-standard integers.
M.P.S. - Then you are using the transfer principle to
conclude that we have an elementary extension?
A.C. - Yes, I am using the transfer principle28 to get
that if z(n) = x(n)y(n) for all n then one has also
∗z(n) = ∗x(n) ∗y(n) for all non-standard n.
M.P.S. - Exploiting the transfer principle presupposes
a model where such a principle applies, such as [for ex-
ample] the ultrapower one constructed using an ultra-
filter, say a selective one. With such a model in the
background, seeking to exhibit a character in a canon-
ical fashion would seem to be canonically equivalent to
seeking to exhibit an ultrafilter. But why not pick the
selective one we started with?29
A.C. -
28Connes’ acknowledgment of his use of the transfer principle was mentioned in
Section 3.4 (see footnote 20).
29The point about choosing the ultrafilter that one started with is related to
the metaphor of the black box that canonically returns its input, mentioned in
Section 3.5 at footnote 23.
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Needless to say, Schu¨tzenberger never challenged Connes as above.
However, the exchange is not entirely virtual: it reproduces an ex-
change of emails in june 2012, between Connes and the second-named
author.30 Connes never replied to the last question about ultrafilters
(see the discussion of the forgetful functor at (3.9)).
4. Definable model of Kanovei and Shelah
In 2004, Kanovei and Shelah constructed a definable model of the
hyperreals. In this section, we explore some of the meta-mathematical
ramifications of their result.
4.1. What’s in a name? Let us consider in more detail Connes’ com-
ment on naming a hyperreal:
What conclusion can one draw about nonstandard anal-
ysis? This means that, since noone will ever be able
to name a nonstandard number, the theory remains vir-
tual (Connes 2001, [41, p. 16]) [emphasis added–the au-
thors]
The exact meaning of the verb “to name” used by Connes here is not
entirely clear. Connes provided a hint as to its meaning in 2000, in the
following terms:
if you are given a non standard number you can canoni-
cally produce a subset of the interval which is not Lebesgue
measurable. Now we know from logic (from results of
Paul Cohen and Solovay) that it will forever be impossi-
ble to produce explicitely [sic] a subset of the real num-
bers, of the interval [0, 1], say, that is not Lebesgue mea-
surable (Connes 2000 [30, p. 21], [32, p. 14]).
The hint is the name Solovay (Robert M. Solovay). Apparently Connes
is relying on the following result, which may be found in (Solovay 1970
[144, p. 3, Theorem 2]).
Theorem 4.1 (Solovay (1970, Theorem 2)). There is a model S of set
theory ZFC, in which (it is true that) every set of reals definable from
a countable sequence of ordinals is Lebesgue measurable.
4.2. The Solovay and Go¨del models. The model S mentioned in
Theorem 4.1 is referred to as the Solovay model by set theorists. The
assumption of “definability from a countable sequence of ordinals”
includes definability from a real (and hence such types of definable
pointsets as Borel and projective sets, among others), since any real
30The email exchange is reproduced here with the consent of Connes [39].
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can be effectively represented as a countable sequence of ordinals —
natural numbers, in this case.
Remark 4.2. The model S contains a submodel S ′ of all sets x that are
hereditarily definable from a countable sequence of ordinals. This means
that x itself, all elements y ∈ x, all elements of elements of x, etc., are
definable from a countable sequence of ordinals. This submodel S ′ is
sometimes called the second Solovay model. It turns out that S ′ is a
model of ZF in which the full axiom of choice AC fails. Instead, the
axiom DC of countable dependent choice31 holds in S ′, so that S ′ is a
model of ZF+DC.
The following is an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.1.
Corollary 4.3 (Solovay (1970, Theorem 1)). It is true in the second
Solovay model S ′ that every set of reals is Lebesgue measurable.
Remark 4.4. A free ultrafilter on N yields a set in (Z/2Z)N which is
nonmeasurable in the sense of the natural uniform probability measure
on (Z/2Z)N. Meanwhile, the second Solovay model S ′ of ZF+DC con-
tains no such sets, and therefore no such ultrafilters, either. It follows
that one cannot prove the existence of a free ultrafilter on N in ZF+DC.
The constructible model L, introduced by (Go¨del 1940, [65]), is an-
other model of ZFC, opposite to the Solovay model in many of its
features, including the existence of definable non-measurable sets of re-
als. Indeed, it is true in L that there is a non-measurable set in R
which is not merely definable, but definable in a rather simple way
which places it in the effective class ∆12 of the projective hierarchy (see
P. Novikov [127]). With these two models in mind, it is asserted that
the existence of a definable Lebesgue non-measurable set is independent
of the axioms of set theory.
4.3. That which we call a non-sequitur. If, in Connes’ terminol-
ogy, “to name” is “to define”, then Connes’ remark to the effect that
since noone will ever be able to name a nonstandard
number, the theory remains virtual (Connes 2001, [41,
p. 16]) [emphasis added–the authors]
31Given a sequence of nonempty sets 〈Xn : n ∈ N〉, the axiom DC postulates
the existence of a countable sequence of choices x0, x1, x2, . . . in the case when,
for each n, the domain Xn of the n
th choice xn ∈ Xn may depend not only on n
but also on the previously made choices x0, x1, . . . , xn−1. It is considered to be the
strongest possible version of “countable choice”.
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is that which we call a non-sequitur. Namely, while an ultrafilter (asso-
ciated with a non-standard number by means of the transfer principle)
cannot be defined, a definable (countably saturated) model of the hy-
perreals was constructed by Kanovei and Shelah (2004, [89]). Their
construction appeared later than Connes’ “virtual” comment cited at
the beginning of Subsection 4.1. However, three years after the pub-
lication of [89], Connes again came back to an alleged “catch in the
theory”:
I had been working on non-standard analysis but after
a while I had found a catch in the theory. . . The point is
that as soon as you have a non-standard number, you get
a non-measurable set. And in Choquet’s circle, having
well studied the Polish school, we knew that every set
you can name is measurable (Connes 2007, [35, p. 26])
[emphasis added–the authors].
An ultrafilter associated with a non-standard number cannot be “named”
or, more precisely, defined ; however, the theory had been shown (three
years prior to Connes’ 2007 comment) to admit a definable model.
Connes’ reference to Solovay suggests that, to escape being virtual, a
theory needs to have a definable model. If so, his “virtual” allegation
concerning non-standard analysis is erroneous, by the result of Kanovei
and Shelah.
Connes’ claim that “every set you can name is measurable” is simi-
larly inaccurate, by virtue of the Go¨del constructible model L, as dis-
cussed in Subsection 4.2. A correct assertion would be the following:
if you “name” a set of reals then you cannot prove (in ZFC) that it is
nonmeasurable, and moreover, one can “name” a set of reals (a Go¨del
counterexample) regarding which you cannot prove that it is measur-
able, either.
Connes elaborated a distinction between countable AC and uncount-
able AC, and criticized NSA for relying on the latter (see Section 3.7).
He invoked the Solovay model to explain why he feels NSA is a “virtual”
theory. Now the second Solovay model S ′ of ZC+DC demonstrates
that ultrafilters on N cannot be shown to exist without uncountable
AC (see Remark 4.2). Thus, no ultrafilters, chimerical or otherwise,
can be produced by means of the countable axiom of choice alone; yet
Connes exploited ultraproducts (and ultrafilters on N) in an essential
manner in his work on the classification of factors (Connes 1976, [25]).
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5. Machover’s critique
In 1993, M. Machover analyzed non-standard analysis and its role in
teaching, expanding on a discussion in J. Bell & Machover [4, p. 573].
We will examine Machover’s criticism in this section.
5.1. Is there a best enlargement? In 1993, Machover wrote:
The [integers, rationals, reals] can be characterized (in-
formally or within set theory) uniquely up to isomor-
phism by virtue of their mathematical properties . . . But
there is no . . . known way of singling out a particular
enlargement that can plausibly be regarded as canoni-
cal, nor is there any reason to be sure that a method
for obtaining a canonical enlargement will necessarily
be invented (Machover 1993 [116]) [emphasis added–the
authors]
The problem of the uniqueness of the nonstandard real line is discussed
in detail in an article by Keisler (1994, [103]), to which we refer an
interested reader. Meanwhile, Machover emphasizes
(A) the uniqueness up to isomorphism of the traditional number
systems (integers, rationals, reals), allegedly unlike the hyper-
reals; and
(B) an absence of a preferred enlargement.
As we will see, he is off-target on both points (though the latter became
entirely clear only after his text was published). We start with three
general remarks.
(1) A methodological misconception on the part of some critics of
NSA is an insufficient appreciation of the fact that the hyperreal ap-
proach does not involve a claim to the effect that hyperreals ∗R are
“better” than R. Rather, one works with the pair (R, ∗R) together
with, say, the standard part function from limited hyperreals to R. It
is the interplay of the pair that bestows an advantage on this approach.
The real field is still present in all its unique complete Archimedean
totally ordered glory.
(2) Noone would dismiss an algebraic number field on the grounds
that it is not as good as Q because of a lack of uniqueness. It goes
without saying that the usefulness of an algebraic number field is not
impaired by the fact that there exist other such number fields.
(3) The specific technical criticism of Machover’s that the hyperreal
enlargement is not unique and therefore one needs to prove that the
notion of “continuity”, for example, is model-independent, is answered
by the special enlargement constructed by Morley and Vaught (1962,
30 VLADIMIR KANOVEI, MIKHAIL G. KATZ, AND THOMAS MORMANN
[124]) for any uncountable cardinality κ satisfying 2α ≤ κ for all α <
κ (see Subsection 5.2 for more details) and providing a unique such
enlargement up to isomorphism.
Remark 5.1. Under the assumption of GCH, the condition on κ holds
for all infinite cardinals κ. If GCH is not assumed, then it still holds
for unboundedly many uncountable cardinals32 κ, one of which (not
necessarily the least one) can be defined by κ = limnan, where a0 = ℵ0
and an+1 = 2
an .
5.2. Aesthetic and pragmatic criticisms. Machover’s critique of
NSA actually contains two separate criticisms even though he tends
to conflate the two. The first criticism is an aesthetic one, mainly ad-
dressed to traditionally trained mathematicians: the reals are unique
up to isomorphism, the hyperreals aren’t. The second criticism is a
pragmatic one, and is addressed to workers in NSA: hyperreal defini-
tions of standard concepts apparently depend on the particular exten-
sion of R chosen, and therefore necessitate additional technical work.
We will comment further on the two criticisms below.
Machover expressed his aesthetic criticism by noting that if we choose
a system of real numbers
in which the Continuum Hypothesis holds, and another
in which it does not [hold], then for each such choice
there are still infinitely many non-isomorphic enlarged
systems of [hyper]reals, none of which has a claim to be
‘the best one’ (Machover 1993, [116, p. 210]).
How cogent is Machover’s aesthetic criticism? The CH-part of his
claim is dubious as it does not accord with what we observed above.
Indeed, as noted in Subsection 3.6, all models of ∗R of the form RN/F
are isomorphic in ZFC+CH (see Theorem 3.3). The uniqueness of the
isomorphism type of such a hyperreal field parallels that of the tradi-
tional structures (integers, rationals, reals) emphasized by Machover in
item (A) above.
The non-CH part of Machover’s claim is similarly dubious. Although
all models of ∗R are not necessarily isomorphic under the ZFC axioms,
still uniqueness up to isomorphism is attainable within the category
of special models, that is, those represented in the form of limits of
certain increasing transfinite sequences of successive saturated elemen-
tary extensions of ∗R. (See a detailed definition in Chang and Keisler
(1990, [19]), 5.1.) The following major theorem is due to Morley and
32Namely, for every cardinal there is one of this kind (note that this is more than
merely “infinitely many”).
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Vaught (1962, [124]), see also 5.1.8 and 5.1.17 in Chang and Keisler
(1990, [19]).
Theorem 5.2. Suppose that an uncountable cardinal κ satisfies the
implication α < κ =⇒ 2α ≤ κ. Then
(1) there are special models of ∗R of cardinality κ, and
(2) all those models are pairwise isomorphic.
Thus, for any cardinal κ as in the theorem, there is a uniquely de-
fined isomorphism type of nonstandard extensions of R of cardinality κ.
Cardinals of this type do exist independently of GCH (see Remark 5.1)
and can be fairly large, but at any rate one does have uniquely defined
isomorphism types of models of ∗R in suitable infinite cardinalities.
Remark 5.3. A decade after the publication of Machover’s article,
Kanovei and Shelah (2004, [89]) proved the existence of a definable
individual model of the hyperreals (not just a definable isomorphism
type), contrary to all expectation (including Machover’s, as the pas-
sage cited above suggests). Further research by Kanovei and Uspensky
(2006, [90]) proved that all Morley–Vaught isomorphism classes given
by Theorem 5.2 likewise contain definable individual models of ∗R.33
Remark 5.4. If one works in the Solovay model S as a background
ZFC universe, then the definable Kanovei–Shelah model of ∗R does
not contain a definable nonstandard integer, as any such would imply
a definable non-measurable set, contrary to Theorem 4.1. The appar-
ent paradox of a non-empty definable set with no definable element is
an ultimate expression of a known mathematical phenomenon when a
simply definable set has no equally simply definable elements.34
As to Machover’s pragmatic criticism addressed to NSA workers, we
note that requiring suitable properties of saturation in a given cardinal,
one in fact does obtain a unique model of the hyperreals. Therefore
the criticism concerning the dependence on the model becomes moot.
33We note that a maximal class hyperreal field (in the von Neumann-Bernays-
Go¨del set theory) was recently analyzed by Kanovei and Reeken (2004, [88, Theorem
4.1.10(i)]) in the framework of axiomatic nonstandard analysis, and by P. Ehrlich
(2012, [55]) from a different standpoint. In each version, it is similarly unique, and,
in the second version, isomorphic to a maximal surreal field.
34For instance, one can define in a few lines what a transcendental real number
is, but it would require a number of pages to prove for an average math student
that pi, e, or any other favorite trancendental number is in fact trancendental.
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5.3. Microcontinuity. Machover recalls a property of a function f
that we will refer to as microcontinuity at a point r ∈ R following
Davis [45, p. 96]:
f(x) ≈ f(r) for every hyperreal x ≈ r. (5.1)
Here “≈” stands for equality up to an infinitesimal. Property (5.1) is
equivalent35 to the usual notion of continuity of a real function f at r.
Machover goes on to assert that
in order to legitimize [(5.1)] as a definition . . . , we must
make sure that it is independent of the choice of en-
largement. (Otherwise, what is being defined would be
a ternary relation between f , r and the enlargement.)
(Machover 1993, [116, p. 208]).
Microcontinuity formally depends on the enlargement. Machover con-
cludes that it cannot replace (ǫ, δ) definitions altogether:
Therefore, [(5.1)] cannot displace the old standard [ǫ, δ]
definition altogether, if one’s aim is to achieve proper
rigour and methodological correctness . . . There is a long
tradition of teaching first-year calculus in a way that
sacrifices a certain amount of rigour in order to make
the material more intuitive. There is, of course, noth-
ing wrong or dishonourable about this–provided the stu-
dents are told that what they are getting is a version
that does not satisfy the highest standards of rigour and
glosses over some problems requiring closer considera-
tion (ibid.) [emphasis added–the authors].
Granted, we need to be truthful toward our students. However, Ma-
chover’s argument is unconvincing, as he misdiagnozes the educational
issue involved. The issue is not whether the (ǫ, δ) definition should be
replaced altogether by a microcontinuous definition as in (5.1). Rather,
the issue revolves around which definition should be the primary one.
Thus, Keisler’s textbook does present the (ǫ, δ) definition (Keisler 1986,
[102, p. 286]), once continuity has been thoroughly explained via mi-
crocontinuity.36 The (ǫ, δ) definition is an elementary formula, which
35Strictly speaking f should be replaced by ∗f in (5.1). Note that, modulo re-
placing the term “hyperreal” by the expression “variable quantity”, definition (5.1)
is Cauchy’s definition of continuity, contrary to a widespread Cauchy–Weierstrass
tale concerning Cauchy’s definition (see Borovik et al. [11] as well as [95, 92]).
36Pedagogical advantages of microcontinuity were discussed in B laszczyk et al. [9,
Appendix A.3].
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shows that continuity is expressible in first order logic, a fact not ob-
vious from the microcontinuous definition (5.1) dependent as it is on
an external relation “≈”. Since the (ǫ, δ) definition needs to be men-
tioned in any case, the apparent dependence of (5.1) on the choice of
an enlargement is a moot point.
6. How powerful is the transfer principle?
The back cover of the 1998 hyperreal textbook by R. Goldblatt de-
scribes non-standard analysis as
a wellspring of powerful new principles of reasoning (trans-
fer, overflow, saturation, enlargement, hyperfinite ap-
proximation, etc.) (see Goldblatt 1998 [66]).
Of the examples mentioned here, we are particularly interested in trans-
fer, i.e., the transfer principle whose roots go back to  Los´’s theorem
( Los´ 1955, [112]). The back cover describes the transfer principle as a
powerful new principle of reasoning.
On the other hand, a well-established tradition started by P. Halmos
holds that the said principle is not powerful at all. Thus, Halmos
described non-standard analysis as
a special tool, too special, and other tools can do every-
thing it does (Halmos 1985, [72, p. 204]).
Are we to conclude that the 1998 back cover contains a controversial
assertion and/or a well-meaning exaggeration? Hardly so. The term
“powerful” is being used in different senses. In this section we will try
to clarify some of the meanings of the term.
6.1. Klein–Fraenkel criterion. In 1908, Felix Klein formulated a cri-
terion of what it would take for a theory of infinitesimals to be success-
ful. Namely, one must be able to prove a mean value theorem (MVT)
for arbitrary intervals, including infinitesimal ones:
The question naturally arises whether [. . . ] it would
be possible to modify the traditional foundations of in-
finitesimal calculus, so as to include actually infinitely
small quantities in a way that would satisfy modern de-
mands as to rigor; in other words, to construct a non-
Archimedean system. The first and chief problem of this
analysis would be to prove the mean-value theorem
f(x+ h)− f(x) = h · f ′(x+ ϑh)
from the assumed axioms. I will not say that progress
in this direction is impossible, but it is true that none of
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the investigators have achieved anything positive (Klein
1908, [104, p. 219]).
In 1928, A. Fraenkel [61, pp. 116-117] formulated a similar criterion in
terms of the MVT.
Such a Klein–Fraenkel criterion is satisfied by the framework de-
veloped by Hewitt,  Los´, and Robinson. Indeed, the MVT is true for
the natural extension ∗f of every real smooth function f on an arbi-
trary hyperreal interval, by the transfer principle. Fraenkel’s opinion
of Robinson’s theory is on record:
my former student Abraham Robinson had succeeded in
saving the honour of infinitesimals - although in quite a
different way than Cohen37 and his school had imagined
(Fraenkel 1967, [62, p. 107]).
The hyperreal framework is the only modern theory of infinitesimals
that satisfies the Klein-Fraenkel criterion. The fact that it satisfies the
criterion is due to the transfer principle. In this sense, the transfer
principle can be said to be a “powerful new principle of reasoning”.
One could object that the classical form of the MVT is not a key
result in modern analysis. Thus, in L. Ho¨rmander’s theory of partial
differential operators (Ho¨rmander [78, p. 12–13]), a key role is played by
various multivariate generalisations of the following Taylor (integral)
remainder formula:
f(b) = f(a) + (b− a)f ′(a) +
∫ b
a
(b− x)f ′′(x)dx. (6.1)
Denoting by D the differentiation operator and by I = I(f, a, b) the
definite integration operator, we can state (6.1) in the following more
detailed form for a function f :
(∀a ∈ R)(∀b ∈ R)
f(b) = f(a) + (b− a)(Df)(a) + I
(
(b− x)(D2f), a, b
) (6.2)
Applying the transfer principle to the elementary formula (6.2), we
obtain
(∀a ∈ ∗R)(∀b ∈ ∗R)
∗f(b) = ∗f(a) + (b− a)(∗D ∗f)(a) + ∗I
(
(b− x)(∗D2 ∗f), a, b
) (6.3)
37The reference is to Hermann Cohen (1842–1918), whose fascination with in-
finitesimals elicited fierce criticism by both G. Cantor and B. Russell. For an
analysis of Russell’s non-sequiturs, see Ehrlich [54] and Katz & Sherry [99], [100].
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for the natural hyperreal extension ∗f of f . The formula (6.3) is valid
on every hyperreal interval of ∗R. Multivariate generalisations of (6.1)
can be handled similarly.
We focused on the MVT (and its generalisations) because, histori-
cally speaking, it was emphasized by Klein and Fraenkel. The transfer
principle applies far more broadly, as can be readily guessed from the
above.
6.2. Logic and physics. There is another sense of the term powerful
that is more controversial than the one discussed in Subsection 6.1.
Namely, how powerful are the hyperreals as a research tool and an
engine of discovery of new mathematics? The usual litany of impres-
sive breakthroughs achieved using NSA includes progress on the invari-
ant subspace problem, canards, hydrodynamics and Boltzmann equa-
tion, non-standard proof of Gromov’s theorem on groups of polynomial
growth, Hilbert’s fifth problem (see Hirschfeld [77] and Goldbring [67]),
etc.38
However, declaiming such a list does little more than encourage the
partisans while further antagonizing the critics. We will therefore com-
ment no further other than clarifying that this is not the meaning of
the term powerful when we use it in reference to the transfer principle.
Namely, we use it solely in the sense explained in Subsection 6.1.
The significance of the back cover comment cited at the beginning
of Section 6 is that Robinson’s theory introduces new perspectives and
intuitions into mathematics, similarly to physics.39 When E. Witten
informally wrote down a pair of equations on the board at MIT a
couple of decades ago, he was motivated by physical intuitions. The
resulting Seiberg-Witten theory caused a revolution in gauge theory,
and in particular resulted in much shorter proofs of theorems that
S. Donaldson received his Fields medal for (see e.g., Katz [96]). Logic,
similarly, introduces new intuitions and techniques. Today logicians
like E. Hrushovski [80] obtain results in “ordinary mathematics” by
model-theoretic means.
Interesting recent uses of non-standard methods as applied to the
structure of approximate groups may be found in Hrushovski [81] and
Breuillard, Green, & Tao [14].
38For additional examples see the book [151].
39Such an analogy between logic and physics is due to David Kazhdan.
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7. How non-constructive is the Dixmier trace?
This section deals with the foundational status of the Dixmier trace,
and with the role of Dixmier trace in noncommutative geometry.
7.1. Front cover. The front cover of the book Noncommutative geom-
etry features an elaborate drawing, done by Connes himself (according
to the copyright page). The drawing contains only three formulas. One
of them is the expression
−
∫
|dZ|p.
The barred integral symbol −
∫
is Connes’ notation for the trace con-
structed by Dixmier (1966 [51]). The notation first occurred in print
in (Connes 1995 [28, p. 6213, formula (2.34)]), i.e., the year after its
appearance on the front cover of Connes’ book. The appearance of
Dixmier’s trace on the book cover indicates not only that Connes was
already thinking of the Dixmier trace as a kind of “integration” (this
idea is already found in Connes 1988 [26]), but also that Connes him-
self thought of the trace as an important ingredient of noncommutative
geometry.
7.2. Foundational status of Dixmier trace. The Dixmier trace is
a linear functional on the space of compact operators whose charac-
teristic values have a specific rate of convergence to 0. In Connes’
framework, the Dixmier trace can be thought of as a kind of an “inte-
gral” of infinitesimals. An analogous concept in Robinson’s framework
is the functional
st(nǫ).
Here n ∈ ∗N \ N is a fixed hypernatural, and the functional is defined
for a variable infinitesimal ǫ constrained by the condition that nǫ is
finite.
Dixmier exploited ultrafilters in constructing his trace. Dixmier
traces can also be constructed using universally measurable medial
limits, independently constructed by Christensen [21] and Mokobodzki
in the assumption of the continuum hypothesis (CH). Mokobodzki’s
work was explained by P. Meyer (1973, [122]). Meyer’s text is cited in
Connes’ book [27], but not in the section dealing with Dixmier traces
(Connes 1994, [27, p. 303-308]), which does not use medial limits and
instead relies on the Hahn–Banach theorem [27, p. 305, line 8 from
bottom].40
40Note that, in the spirit of reverse mathematics, the Hahn–Banach theorem is
sufficient to generate a Lebesgue nonmeasurable set (see Foreman & Wehrung [60],
Pawlikowski [128]).
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Medial limits have been shown not to exist in the assumption of
the filter dichotomy (FD) by P. Larson [107]. FD is known to be
consistent (Blass and Laflamme [8]). The assumption of CH (exploited
in the construction of medial limits) is generally considered to be a very
strong foundational assumption, more controversial than the axiom of
choice (see e.g., J. Hamkins [73], [74]; D. Isaacson [82]).
Indeed, while all the major applications of the “uncountable” AC
outside of set theory proper41 can be reduced to the assumption that
the continuum of real numbers can be wellordered, CH requires, in
addition, the existence of a wellordering of R specifically of length ω1
(which is the shortest possible length of such a wellordering).
Moreover, CH implies the existence of P -point ultrafilters42 on N,
and Shelah [137] showed that the existence of P -points cannot be es-
tablished in ZFC, again indicating the controversial nature of CH.
Furthermore, Connes notes that the results he is interested in happen
to be independent of the choice of the Dixmier trace [27, p. 307, line
14 from bottom]. Thus the strong assumption of CH appears super-
fluous, and the nonconstructive nature of the ultrafilter construction
of the Dixmier trace, a paper tiger. Namely, Dixmier trace is con-
structive or non-constructive in a sense similar to that of a hyperreal
number being constructive or non-constructive: both rely on noncon-
structive foundational material (be it AC, CH, or Hahn-Banach), but
yield results independent of choices made. For instance, differentiat-
ing x2 yields 2x regardless of the variety of infinitesimals exploited in
defining the derivative. Similarly, the notion of continuity, when de-
fined via microcontinuity, is independent of the hyperreal model used
(see Subsection 5.3).
7.3. Role of Dixmier trace in noncommutative geometry. At
a recent conference (see [63]) on singular traces (such as the Dixmier
trace), a majority of the speakers mentioned the Dixmier trace in their
abstracts, while none of them mentioned (or cited) either Mokobodzki
or medial limits. Recent work by the conference speakers dealing with
Dixmier traces includes: Carey, Phillips, & Sukochev [17]; Engliˇs &
Zhang [56]; Lord & Sukochev [109, 110]; Lord, Potapov, & Sukochev
[111]; Kalton, Sedaev, & Sukochev [85]; Sukochev & Zanin [148, 149].
41This includes such constructions as the Vitali non-measurable set, Hausdorff’s
gap, ultrafilters on N, the Hamel basis, the Banach–Tarski paradox, nonstandard
models, etc. Sierpin´ski (1934, [139]) gives many additional examples.
42See footnote 25.
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Most speakers also cite Connes’ Noncommutative Geometry. Ever
since its appearance on the front cover of Connes’ book (see Subsec-
tion 7.1), the Dixmier trace has played a major role in Connes’ frame-
work and related fields.
8. Of darts, infinitesimals, and chimeras
In this section we will be concerned with a somewhat elusive issue
of what is real and what is chimerical.
8.1. Darts. Connes outlined a game of darts in 2000 in the following
terms:
You play a game of throwing darts at some target called Ω
. . . what is the probability dp(x) that actually when you
send the dart you land exactly at a given point x ∈ Ω ?
. . . what you find out is that dp(x) is smaller than any
positive real number ε. On the other hand, if you give
the answer that dp(x) is 0, this is not really satisfactory,
because whenever you send the dart it will land some-
where (Connes 2000, [32, p. 13]) [emphasis added–the
authors].
As Connes points out, no satisfactory interpretation of such intuitions
seems to exist in a real number system devoid of infinitesimals. But
if one interprets the “p” to be an infinitesimal interval rather than
a point, there is a consistent theory that can capture the intuitions
Connes spoke of. Namely, assume for the sake of simplicity that the
target is the unit interval [0, 1]. A more satisfactory answer than the
one above is provided in terms of a hyperfinite grid
GridH =
{
0, 1
H
, 2
H
, 3
H
, . . . , H−1
H
, 1
}
(8.1)
defined by a hypernatural H ∈ ∗N \ N. Then the probability of the
dart hitting an infinitesimal interval [ k
H
, k+1
H
] ⊂ [0, 1] can be taken to
be precisely 1
H
. The hypernatural H can be chosen to be the explicit
unchimerical one appearing in (3.7).
Similarly, the probability of the dart hitting a real set A ⊂ [0, 1] can
be computed as follows. Roughly speaking, one counts the number of
points in the intersection st−1(A) ∩GridH and divides by H , where st
is the standard part function on limited hyperreals, and GridH is the
hyperfinite grid of (8.1), yielding a probability of
|st−1(A) ∩GridH |
H
; (8.2)
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more precisely, since st−1(A) is not an internal set, one takes the infi-
mum of st(|X|/H) over all internal sets X containing st−1(A)∩GridH
(see Goldblatt [66], Lemma 16.5.1 on page 210, and Theorem 16.8.2 on
page 217).
8.2. Chimeras. Probability theory and measure theory over the hy-
perreals are today vast research fields (see e.g., Benci et al. [6], Wen-
mackers & Horsten [152]). Meanwhile, Connes comments as follows:
A nonstandard number is some sort of chimera43 which is
impossible to grasp and certainly not a concrete object.
In fact when you look at nonstandard analysis you find
out that except for the use of ultraproducts, which is
very efficient, it just shifts the order in logic by one
step; it’s not doing much more (Connes 2000, [32, p. 14])
[emphasis added–the authors]
Connes describes ultraproducts as “very efficient”, apparently in con-
trast to the rest of non-standard analysis. Meanwhile, the special case
of an ultraproduct used in the construction of ∗R as in (3.8) exploits an
ultrafilter F described by Connes as a “chimera”. Are we to conclude
that we are dealing with a very efficient chimera?
Remark 8.1. Connes exploits a nonprincipal ultrafilter ω in construct-
ing the ultraproduct von Neumann algebra Nω containing a von Neu-
mann algebra N in Noncommutative geometry :
Definition 11. For every ultrafilter ω ∈ βN \ N let Nω
be the ultraproduct, Nω = the von Neumann algebra
ℓ∞(N, N) divided by the ideal of sequences (xn)n∈N such
that limn→ω ‖xn‖2 = 0 (Connes [27, ch. V, sect. 6.δ,
Def. 11]).44
Perhaps Connes’ intention is similar to that of Leibniz, who some-
times described infinitesimals as “useful fictions” (see Katz & Sherry
[99, 100] and Section 2 below). But Leibniz’s position is generally
thought to be close to a formalist one, akin to Robinson’s, whereas
Connes is known as a Platonist (see Subsection 2.3).45
43See Figure 1. The reader may be amused to find similar terminology in Karl
Marx, who commented as follows: “The closely held belief of some rationalising
mathematicians that dy and dx are quantitatively actually only infinitely small,
only approaching 0/0, is a chimera” (Marx cited in Fahey et al. [58, p. 260]).
44The definition appears on page 495 in the pdf version available from Connes’
homepage, and on page 483 in the published book.
45See also footnote 46 on a comment by Davies.
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Connes goes on to argue that his infinitesimal framework does pro-
vide an adequate framework for solving the dart problem (see [29, for-
mula (2.35)]). However, Connes’ noncommutative infinitesimals do not
form a division ring, do not possess a total order, lack a transfer prin-
ciple, and would have difficulty handling the dart problem as smoothly
as (8.2).
8.3. Shift. What is the meaning of the phrase
“nonstandard analysis . . . just shifts the order in logic
by one step; it’s not doing much more”
penned by Connes (see Subsection 8.2)? The phrase is characteristi-
cally evasive (cf. the discussion of his use of the verb “to name” in Sub-
section 4.1), but perhaps he is referring to the fact that non-standard
analysis permits one to express formulas in second order logic as for-
mulas in first order logic over the hyperreals (hence “shifts the order in
logic by one step”). In this context, it is instructive to consider what
Fields medalist T. Tao has to say concerning the expressive power of
non-standard analysis:
[it] allows one to rigorously manipulate things such as
“the set of all small numbers”, or to rigorously say things
like “η1 is smaller than anything that involves η0”, while
greatly reducing epsilon management issues by automat-
ically concealing many of the quantifiers in one’s argu-
ment (Tao 2008 [150, p. 55]).
The 2009 Abel prize winner M. Gromov said in 2010:
After proving the theorem about polynomial growth us-
ing the limit and looking from infinity, there was a pa-
per by Van den Dries and Wilkie giving a much better
presentation of this using ultrafilters (Gromov cited in
[130]).
Other authors have taken note of Connes’ sweeping judgments of
mathematical subjects not to his liking. Thus, E. B. Davies writes:
In 2001 Alain Connes, a committed Platonist,46 who
has spent a lifetime working on C*-algebras and their
applications, nevertheless excluded the theory of Jordan
algebras from the Platonic world of mathematics . . . How
do mathematicians make such value judgments, and are
46In the context of Davies’ comment on Connes’ Platonism, see also main text at
footnote 45 which examines the possibility that Connes may also hold views close
to Formalism.
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their opinions more than prejudices? (Davies 2011, [44,
p. 1456]) [emphasis added–the authors].
Here Davies is referring to the following comment by Connes:
I would say that the exceptional algebra of three-by-
three matrices on Cayley octonions definitely exists be-
cause of its connections to the Lie group F4. As for the
general notion of Jordan algebra, it is difficult to assert
that it really holds water [41, p. 30].
Connes finds it “difficult to assert” that the theory of Jordan algebras
“holds water”. Meanwhile, E. Zelmanov wrote that I. Kantor’s work
on Jordan algebras (see, e.g., the influential text Kantor [91])
played a crucial role in [Zelmanov’s] proof of the Re-
stricted Burnside problem [155, p. 111],
work for which Zelmanov was awarded the Fields medal in 1994.
8.4. Continuum in quantum theory. Quantum physicists Cˇaslav
Brukner and 2010 Wolf prize winner Anton Zeilinger speculate that
the concept of an infinite number of complementary ob-
servables and therefore, indirectly, the assumption of
continuous variables, are just mathematical construc-
tions which might not have a place in a final formula-
tion of quantum mechanics . . . continuous variables are
devoid of operational and therefore physical meaning in
quantum mechanics” (Brukner & Zeilinger [15, p. 59]).
I. Durham concurs:
This latter proposal47 is similar to coarse-graining argu-
ments in thermodynamic and quantum systems which
have been used by Brukner and Zeilinger to argue that
the continuum is nothing but a mathematical construct,
a view I wholeheartedly endorse (Durham [52]).
In 1994, Wolf prize winner John A. Wheeler wrote:
The space continuum? Even continuum existence it-
self? Except as idealization neither the one entity nor
the other can make any claim to be a primordial cate-
gory in the description of nature (Wheeler [153, p. 308])
[emphasis added–the authors].
47I.e., a proposal to resolve the paradox of quantum behavior of light.
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There appears to be an identifiable view in the quantum physics com-
munity that the mathematical continuum is an idealisation, or to bor-
row Connes’ terminology, it is a “virtual theory” or “chimera”, though
undoubtedly an “efficient” one.
A mathematician need not ordinarily be concerned about opinions
found in a separate scientific community. However, Connes’ motivation
for his framework is drawn from quantum theory, and he frequently
mentions quantum mechanics as the inspiration for his noncommuta-
tive solution of the dart problem (see Subsection 8.1). His references
to alleged “absolutely major flaw” and “irredemiable defect” in Robin-
son’s infinitesimals emanate from their status as an idealisation. But in
quantum theory, the same observation would apply to Connes’ frame-
work based as it is on the continuum, creating tensions with Connes’
Platonism about the latter (see Section 2).
Connes claimed that “it seemed utterly doomed to failure to try to
use non-standard analysis to do physics” (Connes 2007, [35, p. 26]).
Such a claim is particularly dubious coming as it does two decades
after the publication of the 500-page monograph Nonstandard Methods
in Stochastic Analysis and Mathematical Physics by the 1992 Max-
Planck-Award recipient S. Albeverio and others [1], where just such
applications were developed in great detail.
9. Conclusion
The use of non-constructive foundational material such as the ax-
iom of choice in the hyperreal context is similar to the use of non-
constructive foundational material in Connes’ theory. Thus, Connes
exploits the Dixmier trace (Connes 1995, [28, p. 6208]), the Hahn–
Banach theorem (Connes 1994, [27, p. 305]), as well as ultrafilters
(Connes 1994, [27, p. 483], see our Remark 8.1 above). Such concepts
rely on non-constructive foundational material and are unavailable in
the framework of the Zermelo–Fraenkel axioms alone.
Connes claims to provide “substantial and calculable” results based
on his theory exploiting the Dixmier trace [29, p. 211], and laments the
allegedly non-exhibitable nature of Robinson’s infinitesimals. Mean-
while, Dixmier’s construction of the trace relies on the choice of a non-
principal ultrafilter on the integers [51], while an alternative construc-
tion requires the continuum hypothesis (see Section 7). Connes exploits
ultrafilters in classifying factors and in constructing von Neumann al-
gebras, but there are no ultrafilters in the second Solovay model S ′
of the set-theoretic universe ZFC+DC (countable choice only) that
Connes professes to favor. Connes proclaims himself to be an adherent
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of countable AC (see Section 3.7 above), but S ′ is a model of ZFC+DC
containing no ultrafilters, so that Connes’ philosophical advocacy of
countable AC is divorced from the facts on the ground of his scientific
practice.
Thus, Connes’ claims to the effect that his theory produces compu-
tationally meaningful results, allegedly unlike Robinson’s theory, are
unconvincing. There is in fact strong similarity between the two non-
constructivities involved.
Given powerful48 tools such as non-standard enlargements and the
transfer principle, one is able to associate an ultrafilter to a hyperinte-
ger. But such ability is a spin-off of the power of the new principles of
reasoning developed in Robinson’s approach, and is a reflection, not of
a shortcoming, but rather of the strength of Robinson’s method.
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